We provide an examination of the use of zero-cost collars and equity swaps by corporate insiders to hedge the risk associated with their personal holdings in the company's equity. These financial instruments have important implications for insider trading and incentive-based contracts. Our analysis indicates that these transactions generally involve high ranking insiders (CEOs, board members and senior executives) and cover over a third of their equity holdings. We also find that insiders appear to initiate hedging transactions immediately following large price runups, prior to increases in stock price volatility, and prior to poor earnings announcements. In addition, abnormal returns following insider hedging activities are more negative than those associated with ordinary insider sales. Overall, the evidence indicates that executives can use these hedging instruments to significantly alter their effective ownership positions in the firm.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the development, sophistication, and use of strategies that enable individual shareholders, institutional investors and corporate insiders to hedge their stock ownership position within a firm. Zero-cost collars, equity swaps, shorting against the box, exchange funds, and trust structures are just some examples of trading strategies that allow investors to monetize their equity positions in the firm and reduce their exposure to adverse stock price movements.
In this paper, we discuss the growing use of these hedging instruments by corporate insiders and provide evidence on their motivations for using them. Specifically, we examine zero-cost collar and equity swap transactions by corporate insiders from the period January 1996 through December 1998. A zero-cost collar involves the simultaneous purchase of a put option funded by the proceeds received from the sale of a call option on the stock of the company. An equity swap is an exchange of the returns on the firm's stock for the cash flows on another asset such as an index fund or risk-free security. Both collars and swaps provide protection from downward movements in the firm's stock price while allowing insiders to maintain voting rights and (often) dividend payments. 1 We provide information on the structure of these transactions; the individuals within the firm that most often engage in this type of activity; the amount of ownership hedged; the timing of these transactions; and on the stock-price performance prior and subsequent to the initiation of these contracts. We also examine how these transactions relate to typical open-market insider trading in equity securities.
Analysis of these hedging instruments is important because they offer the potential to trade on inside information in a substantially different manner than ordinary insider sales and 1 Zero-cost collars and equity swaps are the most common hedging instruments reported by insiders to the SEC.
purchases. Unlike open-market trades, insider trading in collars and swaps has not historically been readily observable by market participants for two reasons. First, the reporting rules for these instruments were nonexistent prior to 1994 and remain incompletely defined even after a new ruling by the SEC in 1996. Second, when filed, these transactions appear only on Table II of Form 4 filed by insiders with the SEC. In general, the services that provide insider trading data to the financial markets (and others) do not make available the data needed to identify derivative instrument hedging transactions. If these transactions are less likely than open-market purchases and sales to attract market and legal scrutiny, then insiders may have greater incentives to utilize these instruments when they have information that their stock is overvalued.
The use of zero-cost collars and equity swaps by insiders also has important implications for contracting. These transactions allow insiders to affect the sensitivity of their wealth to firm performance. Providing insiders with the ability to hedge the risk associated with their personal equity holdings and human capital investments in the firm may reduce investment distortions and/or prevent costly hedging of cash flows at the corporate level [Amihud and Lev (1981) , and Stulz (1984) ]. On the other hand, the use of these financial instruments has the potential to increase the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrate the conflicts that arise between managers and shareholders when managers hold only small amounts of equity. Similarly, principal-agent models like those of Ross (1973) , Holmstrom (1979) , and Leland and Pyle (1977) show how managerial equity holdings can reduce the moral hazard and asymmetric information problems faced by investors.
Giving insiders the ability to protect their equity holdings from fluctuations in the stock price reduces the link between managerial wealth and firm performance. This in turn may lead managers to make inferior decisions on behalf of shareholders because managers no longer bear the full cost of their actions.
In our sample, we find that high-ranking insiders use collars and swaps to cover a significant proportion of their holdings of the firm's stock. The most common individuals to use these instruments are top executives, such as the CEO/Chairman of the Board, corporate officers including officers who also serve on the board of directors, and board members. The mean number of shares covered by the collar represents 36% of the total holdings of these individuals.
Most of the contracts are characterized as European, and generally have long lives. The data suggest that insiders are able to reduce their exposure to downside risk yet maintain a significant amount of upside gain. On average, we find that the stock price would have to fall by only 11%
for the put-option component of the collar to finish in the money, and rise by 36% for the calloption component to be in the money. The asymmetric nature of these contracts is particularly important if insiders use these instruments when they have private information about firm performance. Thus, for all practical purposes, these hedging instruments offer insiders the ability to engage in the benefits of an equity sale, but without giving up voting rights and with potentially less visibility and perhaps legal liability.
We find significant positive abnormal stock-price performance of 19% relative to the market index over the 120 trading days prior to the collar transaction followed by normal performance over the subsequent six months. The change in performance surrounding the use of these securities is also reflected in the market reaction to earnings announcements. In addition,
we find an increase in the volatility of stock returns following the purchase of these securities.
The decline in relative performance, the market reaction to earnings announcements, and the increase in volatility are consistent with the view that, on average, insiders time their transactions to lock in gains in advance of material changes in firm performance and stock price behavior.
The collar and swap transactions also differ from normal open-market sales by insiders in the same firms. Regular insider sales at the collar firms do not appear to be associated with changes in performance surrounding the sale. Like the collar transactions, we find that insider sales tend to take place following superior stock price performance. Subsequent to an insider sale, however, we do not detect a drop off in performance. The mean cumulative abnormal return over the six-month period subsequent to an insider sale is 9.5%, implying that insiders lose money on the average open-market sale. In addition, the average trade size for an openmarket sale is approximately ten times smaller than the number of shares covered by the average collar. Overall, these results suggest that insiders execute collars and equity swaps differently than normal open-market sales.
Our evidence suggests that insider trading in collars and swaps can have a significant affect on the structure of the contracts between managers and shareholders. Yermack (1997) examines the timing of stock-option grants to CEOs. He finds that managers are more likely to receive an option grant prior to significant improvements in the market performance of the firm.
He suggests that managers who become aware of favorable information about the firm influence the board to grant more performance-based pay. Our work also expands on the paper by Bolster Chance and Rich (1996) , who provide a case study on a single equity swap transaction. They find large negative abnormal returns following the transaction date. To our knowledge, theirs is the only other paper that has examined these insider hedging transactions. Similar to these studies, our results suggest that insiders appear to alter their effective ownership position prior to changes in firm performance.
We also add to the literature on insider trading. A number of studies have found that insider trades precede significant stock price movements. 2 An interesting question is whether insider hedging transactions are executed in the same manner and reveal the same information as an outright sale. Our evidence suggests that the use of these instruments does precede important information about the firm, but that they are different from open market sales. Our findings have potential implications for disclosure rules governing these transactions, and suggest that the information contained in these filings could be useful to the market.
Finally, our results have implications for research on corporate governance. Numerous studies use executive and director shareholdings as a proxy for the alignment of incentives between insiders and shareholders. Our evidence suggests that experiments that take into consideration the ability of managers to alter their effective ownership positions are likely to provide more powerful tests of the affects of ownership on firm structure and performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the mechanics of zero-cost collars and equity swaps, the laws governing the use of these instruments by corporate insiders and the associated reporting requirements. Section 3 discusses the motivations insiders may have for entering into hedging transactions. Section 4 describes our data, and results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion.
Mechanics and Reporting Requirements of Collars and Swaps
Zero-cost collars and equity swaps are private bilateral agreements between a corporate insider and counterparty. The counterparty is usually a commercial or investment bank, which assumes the role of a broker-dealer. Investment banks are motivated to structure these agreements because they receive commission fees or spreads from the deal. In addition, they offer a valuable service to their client that may allow them to expand their business relationship and provide additional services (such as full-service brokerage). 3 When structuring these deals the counterparty can hedge any residual risk by short selling shares of the firm's stock. In addition, these contracts allow the insider to monetize their position by borrowing against the shares escrowed with the counterparty. 
A. Mechanics of Zero Cost Collars and Equity Swaps
Zero-Cost Collar (Costless Collars) . A collar transaction involves the simultaneous purchase of a put option and sale of a call option on the firm's shares. A popular type of collar is the zero-cost collar (also known as a "costless collar' or "cash-settled collar"). Typically, the proceeds from the sale of the call are used to offset the cost of the put, which eliminates the cost of the hedging instrument. The put provides insurance to the holder against any downward movement in the stock price below the strike price. Any movement above the strike price of the call is lost profit. In addition, collars also have favorable tax implications. Because collars are not considered "constructive sales" under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC Section 1259, resulting from The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997; HR 105-364) , the insider can defer capital gains taxes on any appreciation of their securities realized from the day they acquired their shares through the life of the collar. 3 An investment bank that structures the derivative transaction may also be interested in establishing a relationship with executives in the hopes of performing other services for the firm, such as underwriting any equity or debt offerings. 4 For a more complete discussion of swaps, collars and similarly structured instruments see Braddock (1997) , Allen and Showers (1991), Beder (1992) , Gastineau (1993) , and Bolster, Chance and Rich (1996) . 5 In order to do so, however, the insider must maintain enough market exposure so that the purchase of the put option is not considered a "constructive sale" of the stock. The legislative history to both the House of Representatives 1997 tax bill and the Senate amendment describe "collar" transactions. They both recommend that Treasury regulations provide standards for determining which collar transactions result in constructive sales, according to a report issued by congressional conferees (Herman and McGee, 1997) . No formal standards have been outlined. Currently, brokerage institutions have structured these instruments so that the put side is out of the money by at least 10% [Achstatter (1998) ].
Equity Swap (or Diversification Swap) . In an equity swap, the insider exchanges the future returns on their stock for the cash flows of another financial instrument such as the S&P 500 index, or the returns tied to some interest rate such as LIBOR. of the month following the month of the (non-exempt) transaction. The Form 4 has a header which identifies the statement month for the filing, the name, identification number, address and the position/relationship of the insider to the issuer, and the name and ticker of the issuer of the securities identified by the filing. The rest of the form is divided into two Tables: Table I is the report of non-derivative securities acquired, disposed of, or beneficially owned. It contains important information about transactions and holdings, including the title of the security, the transaction date, a transaction code (describing the nature of the transaction), the number of shares acquired/disposed and the transaction price. shown as the title of the security. When the SEC published their initial ruling (proposal for comment) on swaps in 1994, Peter Romeo, a former SEC counsel said, "If the attraction of these swaps was to avoid disclosure, that attraction has been taken away" (Getler, 1994) .
In 1994, CDA/Investnet was the contractor who was entering Form 4 data for the SEC, and neither they nor other insider trading analysts were able to find more than one filing of a derivative transaction for that year in their archives. The one swap transaction they did find was by Autotote Corp's chairman and chief executive officer, who detailed his five-year swap arrangement with Bankers Trust New York Corp as a footnote to his Form 4 filing in March, 1994 (Getler, 1994 . The lack of apparent filings reporting swaps is especially strange given that the Managing Director of Bankers Trust, the company executing the swap, said "the bank has done many deals like it". Even after the SEC ruling in 1994, it appears that insiders were not reporting these transactions, or that they were not being filed in a way that made them detectable.
In 1996, after receiving comments from interested parties, the SEC formalized their position regarding collars and swaps in release No. 34-347260 (1996) . They backed away from their earlier requirements and indicated that "any manner of reporting an equity swap, or an instrument with similar characteristics, that provides an adequate description of the transaction is appropriate"(pg. 63). 8 At this time the SEC also introduced a new transaction code, "K", to handle the reporting of equity swaps and other similar instruments. They did not, however, require the use of this code and instead reiterated the position that they had taken in release no. 34-347260, described above. Subsequently, insiders were given some leeway in how they could 8 The report must provide the following information: (1) the date of the transaction, (2) the term of the swap, (3) the number of underlying shares of issuers stock, (4) the exercise or settlement price, (5) the non-exempt acquisition (or disposition) of shares at the commencement of the term, (6) the non-exempt acquisition (or disposition) of shares at the end of the term (and on any earlier dates on which an adjustment or interim settlement occurs), (7) the number of shares owned by the insider after termination of the swap, and (8) in the open market [e.g., Ip (1997) ].
Motivations for the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders

A. The Implications of Collars and Swaps for Insider Trading
Like other capital market transactions by insiders, the use of collars and equity swaps may provide insiders the opportunity to profit (avoid losses) from their information advantage relative to other market participants. These contracts protect the insider from downward movements in the stock price, implying that insiders have incentives to engage in these transactions prior to poor performance. Offsetting the profit motive, however, are the threat of legal penalties. Insiders are prohibited from trading while in possession of material valuerelevant information, and are subject to Section 10(b)-5 and Rule 16(b), which require the insider to either disclose their private information or refrain from trading, and to disgorge any shortswing profits, respectively. Insiders are also prohibited from shorting their firm's stock.
There are a number of significant distinctions between insider sales and purchases in the open market and the use of collars and swaps that may affect insiders' incentives to utilize these instruments. First, open market sales of equity before significant stock price declines often attract the attention of shareholders and the SEC, resulting in legal action against corporate insiders [e.g., Eth and Dicke (1994) ]. 11 As previously discussed, however, collars and swaps may be less likely to be detected by market participants or the firm's shareholders because they are reported only on Table II of Form 4 (The Statement of Beneficial Ownership). In addition, while hedging instruments have been around for a long time, the latest SEC reporting rules, which were released in 1996, allow significant latitude in the reporting of equity swaps and do not fully address the reporting of other hedging instruments. Finally, there are no apparent restrictions on when a collar agreement can be terminated. 12 These features of collars and swaps potentially allow insiders to receive the benefits of a sale without giving up voting rights and without openly revealing the transaction to the market.
swap. No other details were revealed about the structure of the exchange fund in the filing. 11 Executives at Donnkenny, one of our sample firms were prosecuted for accounting fraud. Several executives were also investigated for insider trading. A collar transaction initiated by Richard Rubin, the CEO of Donnkenny, was cited in the suit. Our search of other insider trading enforcement actions did not turn up any other cases in which collars or swaps were mentioned. 12 If an insider, however, unwinds the collar before six months has elapsed the transaction would be subject to the short-swing profit rule [Section 16(b) 
B. The Impact of Collars and Swaps on Incentives
Providing managers with the ability to hedge their exposure to firm specific risk has potential benefits to shareholders. Differences in risk aversion between shareholders and managers can impose agency costs on the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrate how managers who are unable to diversify their equity position within the firm may choose negative NPV projects as long as the investments reduce the variance in stock returns. Similarly, Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate how managers may choose to hedge corporate cash flows to protect their personal wealth tied to the firm.
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May (1995) finds evidence consistent with these theories. He finds that CEOs with more personal wealth invested in the firm are more likely to diversify the firm. Because diversification has been associated with poor performance, diversification strategies motivated by managers' desire to reduce their personal risk could harm shareholders. 14 Tufano (1996) studies corporate hedging practices in the gold mining industry and finds that firms whose managers hold more options manage less gold price risk and firms whose managers hold more stock manage more gold price risk. These arguments imply that providing managers with the ability to hedge their personal holdings and the risk associated with their firm-specific human capital may reduce investment distortions within the firm and/or prevent costly hedging of cash flows at the corporate level.
15 exemption. 13 Firms may use derivative securities at the corporate level to reduce their expected tax burden [Smith and Stulz (1985) ], to reduce the investment distortions associated with financial distress and debt financing [Smith, Smithson, and Wilford (1990) and Bessembinder (1991) ], and to lower the cost of financing [Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ]. 14 Lang and Stulz (1994) find a positive correlation between Tobin's Q and firm focus. Berger and Ofek (1995) observe that the sum of the imputed values for the individual segments of a diversified firm is 13% to 15% higher than the value of the combined firm. Comment and Jarrell (1995) demonstrate that reductions in diversification are associated with increases in firm value, while John and Ofek (1995) note that asset sales lead to an improvement in operating performance when there is a corresponding improvement in focus. 15 An open questions is the extent to which other mechanisms, such as compensation contracts, could substitute for managerial hedging. For example, the convexity of the option component of pay may reduce investment distortions caused by the concavity of the managers utility function.
Conversely, allowing managers to use financial instruments to hedge their ownership positions has the potential to increase the agency conflict between stockholders and insiders.
Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of having managerial wealth sensitive to shareholder value. 16 Giving insiders the flexibility to protect their holdings from fluctuations in stock price reduces the link between managerial wealth and firm performance. Moreover, most collars and swaps separate cash flows from voting rights, which may further add to the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983) find that voting rights contain non-pecuniary benefits. Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) find that dual class recapitalizations, which tend to give insiders greater control of voting rights, are harmful to shareholders. If managers use collars and equity swaps to reduce the sensitivity of their wealth to firm performance, they may exert less effort and consume more perquisites than they would otherwise, resulting in lower firm value.
Data
Data for collar and equity swap filings comes from Primark Data Company, a company that was contracted by the SEC to collect information on insider trading from Forms 3, 4, and 5.
Data from Table I of these filings are published in the Official Summary of Securities
Transactions and Holdings, a monthly publication of the SEC. Primark began collecting both Table I and Table II data in electronic form in January of 1996 and providing related products to institutional investors in 1997. We use this data in our study. 16 For example, Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1988) find a piecewise-linear relation between inside ownership and Tobin's Q. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that the sensitivity of managers' wealth to firm performance is too small to adequately align their incentives with those of shareholders. Similarly, Mehran (1995) finds a positive relation between CEO ownership and Tobin's Q.
We constructed a series of queries for the Table II data that were designed to find any individual data element from a filing that could be related to a collar or equity swap transaction.
Our initial queries resulted in a sample of over 1,000 transactions. Next we reviewed the data resulting from these queries and identified transactions that were obviously not collars or swaps.
The Primark Data Company then provided us with a paper copy of every filing. From the filings we identified 87 zero-cost collar transactions and two equity swap transactions by insiders in 65 firms from the period January 1996 through December 1998. The fact that only two equity swaps are detected is consistent with the tax disadvantage of these transactions relative to zero-cost collars. Our sample contains 15 transactions in 1996, 39 in 1997, and 35 in 1998. The increase in the number of reported transactions is consistent with an increase in the popularity and availability of these instruments and with the implementation of better developed disclosure requirements. During the sample period, 51 of our firms report one collar/swap transaction, seven firms report two, four firms report three, and three firms report four. In addition, these transactions are generally associated with high ranking individuals within the firm. Our sample contains 23 transactions by CEOs/Chairmen of the board of directors, 44 by corporate officers, including those that serve on the board, 20 by directors, and two by ten percent blockholders.
Although we have attempted to identify all collar and swap transactions in the population, there are several reasons why our data may understate the actual usage of hedging instruments.
First, the latitude given to insiders in the reporting rules promulgated by the SEC make the transactions difficult to identify from the data in electronic form. In addition, the ambiguity surrounding reporting of these instruments also could reduce the incentives to report. Getler (1994) and Puri (1997) ]. Finally, besides issues of under reporting, the long bull market, which overlaps our sample period, may to some extent mitigate the current demand for insider hedging.
For our set of sample firms we identified a set of control firms that do not file collar or swap transactions that are matched by size and industry. We use the book value of total assets for our size match and the three-digit SIC code from Compustat for our industry match. If the matched firm differed in size from the sample firm by more than 20% we match using the twodigit SIC code. We match using financial data available in the year prior to the transaction, and define our matched firms using the earliest reported collar/swap transaction of the corresponding sample firm. Thus, we match only one firm to each of our sample firms, regardless of the number of collars reported by that firm.
From corporate proxy statements, we gathered information on the ownership of officers and directors, and the composition and size of the board of directors. We employ a director classification scheme similar to the taxonomy used in Weisbach (1988 trading activity (open-market equity sales and purchases) from Primark. Panels B and C provide information about the call and put components of the collars.
Empirical Findings
A. Characteristics of the Zero-Cost Collars
The average stock price on the day of the transaction is $35. The average exercise price of the call is $48, which puts the call out of the money by about 36% on the transaction date. The average exercise price of the put is $31, which places the put about 11% out of the money on the transaction date. The average percentage spread between the strike prices on the call and put
(not reported in the table) is 47%. Most of the spread comes from the call component.
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The results in Table 1 clearly illustrate the potential benefits of the collar transactions to insiders. On average, insiders are protected from price declines greater than 11%, but retain the gains from price increases less than 36%. The asymmetric nature of the collar spread is particularly relevant if insiders possess better information than the market about future firm performance. Overall, the data indicate that insiders who enter into a collar hedge a significant fraction of their ownership, do so for a significant period of time, and can potentially achieve significant economic benefits from the transaction.
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B. Comparison of Collar Firms to a Control Sample
To provide insight into the motivations of insiders to engage in collars and swaps we examine differences in financial and governance characteristics between firms where insiders use the characteristics of the swap and because the vast majority of our observations are collars we focus in this section on the sample characteristics of the collar observations. 21 We ran some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations to value the options on the transaction date with a simple Black-Scholes model. We used the average stock and exercise prices in our sample and assumed a stock price volatility of 30%. The calls were priced at almost the same value as the puts, which is consistent with the collars being zero cost on the transaction date. 22 We also examined if the structure of the collar was affected by the position of the insider within the firm, but did collars and swaps and those where they do not. Specifically, we expect that collars are more likely to be used in firms with a greater degree of information asymmetry between the firm and the market (e.g., in firms that have high market-to-book ratios and younger firms) because insiders in these firms may have better information about the future prospects of these firms.
The demand for hedging should also be stronger in firms that have been performing well because insiders in these firms will have had large increases in the value of their equity stakes.
Alternatively, if high stock returns are a signal of overvaluation, then insiders will be more likely to engage in collars to lock in their gains prior to declines in the firm's stock price. Finally, if insiders are subject to non priced risk, they will be more likely to engage in hedging transactions when they expect an increase in uncertainty about the firm's operations.
Levels of insider ownership may also be related to the use of collars. Insiders that hold large equity stakes may be more concerned with firm-specific risk leading to a demand for hedging instruments. Collars may also be more likely to be used in firms where insiders have more discretion (e.g., firms that have insider dominated boards). Alternatively, firms with large insider equity stakes and outsider dominated boards may be more likely to have mechanisms in place that inhibit insiders' ability to opportunistically engage in these types of transactions.
23 Table 2 compares financial and governance characteristics between the set of collar firms and a set of matched firms. The mean (median) value of total assets is $3.4 billion ($401 million) for the collar firms and $3.2 billion ($522 million) for the control firms. 24 The collar firms and the control firms are not significantly different in size, indicating a good size match.
not find any significant differences. 23 Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (1999) provide some evidence that firms with higher insider ownership are more likely to have company imposed restrictions on insider trading in general. They do not provide evidence regarding restrictions on the use of derivative securities. 24 The restrictions on the types of investors that are be able to structure one of these transactions with a an investment bank to some extent dictate the size of the firms. Usually the brokers require a minimum stock price of $5.00 per share and the stock volume to be at least 10,000 shares or more per day. These restrictions ensure
The average market-to-book ratio of our sample firms is 3.73, which is quite high in absolute terms and significantly different at the one percent level from that of the matched firms (2.21).
Our sample firms are considerably younger than our control firms. The sample firms have existed for approximately 8.5 years on average, while the matched firms' average age is 13.5
years. The age difference is statistically significant at the one percent level.
The sample firms perform very well prior to the date of the collar transaction. Over the 120 trading days preceding initiation of the collar, our sample firms outperform the market index by 16% on average. The abnormal returns for the matched sample average a negative 7%, and the difference in abnormal returns between the sample and matched firms is highly significant (p-value=0.001). There is also some evidence that insiders engage in collars and equity swaps when they expect an increase in uncertainty. To proxy for the change in uncertainty we calculate the ratio of the standard deviation of stock returns in the period following the initiation of the collar transaction to that in the period preceding the date of the collar transaction. This ratio averages 1.16 for our sample firms and 1.08 for the matched firms, suggesting that volatility increases after insiders enter into collar transactions. The difference in volatility ratios, however, is not statistically significant.
The boards of our sample firms are composed of 37% inside directors and 27% outside directors on average. The corresponding numbers for the matched sample are 36% and 36%, respectively. The difference is not statistically significant for insiders, but is highly significant (p-value=0.003) for outsiders. Our sample firms are also less likely to have a board composed of a majority of outsiders (outsider representation>50%). Outsider majority boards are present in 11% of our sample firms and in 20% of our matched firms. The difference is significant at the five percent level. The higher number of gray directors in our sample firms largely drives these adequate trading liquidity for the purposes of hedging the collars risk by the counterparty. differences in outside board representation. The findings on board structure suggest that hedging transactions by insiders are more common in firms with fewer outside directors. In addition to fewer outside directors, collar firms are also more likely to have one or more financiers on the board. These directors may provide expertise in structuring these transactions.
The average ownership by all officers and directors in the collar/swap firms is 17.8% and 21.7% in the control firms. The ownership difference, however, is not statistically significant.
The overall ownership levels for both the collar/swap sample and the control sample are similar to that found in Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) . They find average (median) ownership of 21.1% (14.4%) for a broad sample of 4,202 publicly traded firms in 1995.
However, their sample likely contains more small firms than does ours.
To investigate the relative importance of firm characteristics associated with the use of collars and swaps, we perform multivariate logit analysis. The dependent variable is one for firms that have one or more collar or swap transactions. The independent variables are measures of firm and governance characteristics. We estimate two different model specifications. Model one includes only financial characteristics, and model two includes financial and governance characteristics.
The results of the logistic regressions in Table 3 are consistent with most of our hypotheses and with the univariate test results. With the exception of firm size, all of the other variables in the regressions are statistically significant. We find that insiders in firms with a greater degree of information asymmetry are more likely to hedge their ownership positions.
Specifically, firms with high market-to-book ratios and younger firms are significantly more likely to have insiders that adopt a collar or equity swap. In line with our expectations, insiders are significantly more likely to initiate a collar following a period of strong prior performance.
Ceteris paribus, insiders in firms that experience the largest increases in stock return volatility subsequent to the collar transaction are more likely to engage in hedging transactions. The results on volatility suggest that insiders are more likely to enter into a collar prior to a period of increased uncertainty about firm performance. Consistent with our univariate analysis, collar/swap firms have fewer outside directors on the board. In the multivariate analysis, however, we find lower ownership of officers and directors associated with firms where the insiders have a collar or swap. This last finding is somewhat puzzling, but may also reflect some unaccounted for effect of firm age or firm size.
C. Stock Price Changes Surrounding Collar Transactions
Potentially, collars and swaps give insiders the ability to effectively engage in an "undetected" sale by providing a mechanism where insiders profit from inside information without triggering the scrutiny and discipline of shareholders or even the SEC. If insiders exploit their information advantage when initiating a collar in order to reduce their exposure to adverse stock price movements then we expect to find a relative decline in stock-price performance in the period following the transaction. In the extreme, if insiders act on information that indicates the stock is overvalued, we expect to see collar transactions precede large negative abnormal returns on the firm's stock. In contrast, if insiders do not act on superior information when they enter into collars and swaps then we do not expect systematic patterns in abnormal returns surrounding insider hedging transactions.
Cumulative abnormal returns are plotted in Figure 1 for the 250 days preceding and 120
days following the 89 insider hedging transactions in our sample. We follow abnormal stock price movements up to six months (120 trading days) following an insider hedging transaction.
The six month window is similar to those used in other studies of insider trading, and also ensures that the insider can unwind the position without violating the short-swing profit rule. We use two different benchmarks to calculate cumulative abnormal returns. First, we measure abnormal performance relative to the equally weighted market index. Second, we compute abnormal performance relative to our size and industry matched set of control firms. Traditional event study techniques based on the use of residuals from the market model are problematic
given the large runup in stock prices prior to the collar transactions. 25 Table 4 reports the CARs and t-statistics over various intervals. Given the similarity in results for the market index and control firm benchmarks illustrated in Figure 1 , Table 4 only reports results relative to the market index.
Both Figure 1 and Table 4 show that collar and swap transactions occur after large positive movements in the firm's stock price. As seen in Figure 1 , our sample firms outperform their benchmarks by a margin of 40% in the year (250 trading days) preceding the collar. Over the 120 trading days prior to the transaction, Table 4 indicates a statistically significant mean cumulative abnormal return relative to the market index of 18.96% (p-value=0.001). These abnormal returns are both statistically and economically significant. In the 120 day period following the collar transaction we detect no abnormal performance. The mean cumulative abnormal return relative to the market index in the 120 day period following the collar transactions is a negative 2.74% (p-value=0.467). 26 The pattern of abnormal returns suggests that, on average, insiders act on their informational advantage and enter into zero-cost collars and 25 Specifically, market model intercepts from the estimation period are significantly positive, leading to spurious negative abnormal performance over the event window period. For example, the abnormal returns from a market model event study are a highly significant negative 28% over the 120 days following collar and swap transactions.
We avoid estimation problems in the benchmark returns by measuring abnormal returns relative to the market index and our control firms. 26 Interestingly, we find a significantly positive abnormal return of 1.7% over the three-day period following the transaction date. Data on these transactions is not available to market participants on this date, but is filed with the SEC by the tenth day of the month after the transaction date. We also examined various event windows surrounding the SEC stamp dates (the date the filing is received by the SEC) [e.g., (-1,0) and (-1,1)] and found no evidence of equity swaps to lock in substantial gains. These gains, however, appear to be permanently impounded in the firms' stock prices, implying that the average insider does not profit significantly from the collar or swap due to declines in the stock price subsequent to the transaction date.
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To further investigate the motivations of insiders who hedge the risk associated with their equity stakes, we investigate the cross-sectional variation in abnormal performance following collar and swap transactions. In Table 5 The results in Table 5 show that abnormal returns following the transactions are positively related to prior performance. This fact is consistent with the notion that large stock price runups increase the normal demand for hedging by corporate insiders. They do not support the hypothesis that firms with the largest stock-price runups are more overvalued. Table 5 also shows that post-collar abnormal returns are negatively related to increases in volatility. This finding provides additional evidence that some insiders may time their transactions to coincide both with periods of high volatility and low returns. The coefficients on the position indicator abnormal stock price behavior. 27 Carpenter and Remmers (1999) find a similar pattern of abnormal stock-price performance following insider stock variables provide weak evidence that, ceteris paribus, transactions by directors tend to have more negative abnormal returns compared to other executives. The coefficient on firm age is not significant, suggesting that the well documented poor performance of IPO firms (e.g., Ritter 1991) does not explain our findings. The coefficients on the fraction of stockholdings covered by the collar and the percentage in the money of the put option are negative, but neither are statistically significant. These last results do not support the idea that insiders cover a larger portion of their holdings or place a tighter floor on their losses when they expect performance to be poor in the future.
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The evidence in Tables 4 and 5 indicates that, on average, insiders enter into collars and swaps around a decline in relative firm performance and prior to an increase in the volatility of equity returns. These findings provide some evidence that insiders strategically time these transactions. To provide additional evidence on the timing issue, we examine the market reaction to earnings announcements both before and after these hedging transactions.
D. Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements Around Collar and Swap Transactions
Quarterly earnings announcements provide information to investors that can be used to update perceptions about future financial performance. If insiders take advantage of their superior information about firm performance to strategically time the use of a collar or swap, we expect them to do so prior to a decline in firm performance. If executives are timing their transactions in hedging instruments to coincide with changes in firm performance, we expect to observe a more negative market reaction to earnings announcements that immediately follow a option exercises. 28 These variables may not provide a powerful test of this hypothesis, however, because both are constrained by regulatory and market conditions. The exercise price of the put component is affected by IRS tax rules, while the number of shares covered may be truncated from below because of minimum dollar value requirements imposed by investment banks for these transactions. collar or swap transaction relative to the market reaction to earnings announcements just prior to these transactions. Table 6 , presents the market reaction to earnings announcements around the execution of a zero-cost collar or equity swap. We examine the two earnings announcements prior and the one immediately following the collar or swap transaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using the residuals from a market model with parameters estimated over the period beginning 250 days and ending 51 days prior to the event date. Abnormal returns relative to the market index (not reported) yield similar inferences. To capture any information leakage surrounding the earnings announcement and for robustness we use (-10,2), (-5,2), and (-2,2) event windows. Table 6 indicates that the average market reaction to earnings announcements just prior to collar and swap transactions is significantly positive for all three windows. In contrast, the market reaction to the first earnings announcement following these transactions is significantly negative. Over the five day period surrounding the earnings announcement (-2,2), the average cumulative abnormal return for the earnings announcement at t-1 is 0.86% (p-value=0.062), while that for the earnings announcement at t+1 is -2.85% (p-value=0.000). For all the event windows there is a statistically significant difference in the market reaction between the pre-and post-collar transaction periods. The market reaction to earnings announcements is consistent with the change in stock price performance documented earlier, and provides additional evidence that insiders strategically time their use of these instruments.
E. Abnormal Returns and Trading Activity Associated with Insider Sales
Because of their differing reporting requirements and favorable tax treatment, insiders may view collars and swaps as a means of mimicking a sale transaction, but with less visibility and potentially lower legal liability. Consequently, we expect abnormal stock price performance following insider hedging transactions to be more negative than that associated with typical insider selling activity and that these transactions will cover significantly more shares than regular open market sales of equity. We provide evidence about how collar and swap transactions compare to insider selling activity, by examining trade sizes and abnormal returns following open-market insider sales for our sample firms. Table 7 reports abnormal returns associated with all insider sales for our firms occurring over the period beginning 42 months prior and ending six months prior to the execution of a collar/swap. We end six months prior to the initiation of the first collar reported, to ensure that we measure returns associated with typical trading activity within the firm. Our sample consists of 2,460 sales in 58 of the 65 collar firms where insiders trade during this time period. Panel A presents results for all insider trades, and Panel B presents the results for trades over 10,000
shares. We examine large insider transactions because they could provide a better benchmark if collar transactions are associated with a larger number of shares than a normal sale. We find that, similar to the collar and swap transactions, insider sales in our firms occur following large stock-price runups. Abnormal performance for the 120 days preceding a regular insider sale is 15.4% and for sales over 10,000 shares is 20%. Unlike collar transactions, however, the stock price continues to rise following insider sales for both regular and the larger trades. In our sample firms, insiders who sell equity on the open market lose money on average. The average cumulative abnormal returns over the 120 days following insider sales in Panel A and Panel B are 9.49% and 13.4%, respectively, and both are significant at the one percent level. These findings contrast with results in many previous studies of insider trading, which find that insiders generally earn abnormal profits from trading in their own securities [e.g., see Rozeff and Zaman (1988 ), and Seyhun (1986 , 1992 ]. We attribute the differences to the types of firms that appear in our sample and to our sample period. Table 8 , repeats the analysis in Table 7 for 248 insider sales by the same insiders that later engage in collar transactions. We note that, in Table 8 , we were only able to identify sale transaction by insiders who later engage in collars in 32 of our sample firms, suggesting that these insiders are not active sellers prior to the time they engage in a hedging transaction. The results shown in Table 8 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7 . Overall, these findings contrast with the insignificant abnormal returns following collar transactions documented in Table 4 and are consistent with the notion that collars and swaps may attract less scrutiny than insider sales.
The average trade size of insider sales also suggests that insiders view collar and swap transactions in a substantially different manner than a regular sale of equity on the open market.
The average trade size for all insider sales corresponding to Panel A of Table 7 is 26,113 shares.
For large sales, corresponding to Panel B of Table 7 , the average trade size is 51,453 shares.
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This compares with the average trade size for collar transactions of 237,411 shares reported in Table 1 .
To further examine whether insiders engage in collars and swaps instead of insider sales to reduce their potential legal liability, we analyze open-market insider trading in: 1) a benchmark period beginning 42 months prior and ending six months prior to the collar/swap transaction (trading days -900 to -121), 2) The six months just before the collar/swap transaction (trading days -120 to -1) and 3) the three months immediately following the collar/swap transaction (trading days +1 to +60). Table 9 illustrates trading activity associated with these 29 The corresponding numbers from Table 8 The data indicate an increase in the number of trades but not in the amount of shares traded between the benchmark period and the days surrounding the derivative transactions. For example, on average, insiders make a sale on 7.3% of the available trading days in the benchmark period. Insiders trade on 12.5% of the days in the 120-day period just prior to a collar and 10.5% of the days in the period 60-days after a collar transaction, on average.
Relative to the benchmark period, the difference in selling rates is statistically significant in the pre-transaction period, but is not significantly different from zero in the post-transaction period.
The data also show that insider purchases are suppressed during both the pre-and posttransaction periods. The total number of shares traded per day, however, while slightly larger in the periods surrounding the derivative transaction, are not statistically significantly different from the benchmark period. The data indicate that there is an increase in the rate of net insider selling activity around the time insiders engage in a derivative transaction but we do not find any increase in the net number of shares sold. The evidence that insider hedging transactions cover a significantly larger number of shares than a typical insider sale and take place during a period of increased open-market insider selling activity is consistent with the view that insiders may engage in collars and equity swaps at times when an outright sale would likely draw increased scrutiny.
Conclusion
The development of various hedging strategies has given insiders greater flexibility to alter their effective ownership positions and trade on superior information about firm 30 The methodology is similar to that used in Karpoff and Lee (1991). 28 performance. These instruments allow insiders to hedge their personal wealth and human capital investments in the firm, but may also lead to greater agency conflicts between owners and managers. Moreover, the reporting requirements for these contracts may make them less visible than insider transactions in the open market.
Our analysis indicates that these hedging transactions are important from the perspective of both the insiders that use these instruments and other market participants. Our data suggest that insiders hedge a significant fraction of their equity holdings, and that transactions are timed to lock in gains prior to material changes in firm performance and increases in stock-price volatility. Furthermore, the abnormal returns following insider transactions in collars and swaps are more negative than those that follow regular insider sales. Our findings suggest that knowledge of these transactions may convey valuable information to investors. Table 1 Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of zero-cost collars and the fraction of ownership covered. Panel A provides general information on the collars that includes the time until expiration in days, the number of shares covered, the percentage of ownership covered, and the percentage of ownership covered excluding observations that exceed 100%. Panel B reports the characteristics of the call component of the option, including the stock price on the transaction date, the exercise price, the dollar amount the option is in or out of the money on the transaction date, and the percentage that the call is in or out of the money on the transaction date. Panel C reports the same statistics for the put component of the collar. Data for the collar transactions come from Table 2 Summary statistics and comparison of financial and governance characteristics for firms with insiders that purchase zero-cost collars or equity swaps and a matched sample of firms. Firms are matched by total assets and three-digit SIC code. Data for the collar transactions come from Table 3 Logistic regressions of the likelihood of insiders engaging in a zero-cost collar or equity swap. The dependent variable is one for firms where an insider purchased a collar or swap. Independent variables include firm size, the firm's market-to-book ratio, abnormal returns relative to the market in the year preceding the collar, the ratio of the standard deviation of stock returns following the initiation of the collar or swap transaction to that preceding the initiation of the collar or swap transaction, firm age, ownership of insiders, and board composition. Firms are matched by total assets and SIC code. Data for the collar transactions come from Table 5 Cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns following transactions in zero-cost collars and equity swaps by corporate insiders. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return calculated relative to the market model over the period 120 days following the transaction date. Independent variables include the position of the individual that engaged in the collar, the prior year abnormal stock price performance, the ratio of the standard deviation of stock returns following the initiation of the collar relative to the standard deviation of stock returns prior to the transaction date, firm age, the fraction of the insider's shares covered by the collar, and percentage that the put option component of the collar is in the money. The sample consists of 89 transactions in zero-cost collars and equity swaps by corporate insiders in 65 firms from the period January 1996 through December 1998. Table 6 Abnormal returns around earnings announcements in firms whose executives enter into zero cost collars and equity swaps between January 1996 and December 1998. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated over various intervals surrounding earnings announcements. The announcement at t+1 is the first earnings announcement following the initiation of the hedging transaction. The announcements at t-1 and t-2 are the nearest and second nearest earnings announcements prior to the transaction date, respectively. Abnormal returns are calculated using the residuals from a market model with parameters estimated over the period beginning 250 days and ending 51 days prior to the event date. Returns and the equally weighted market index are from the Datastream equity prices database. For abnormal returns Z-statistics are in parentheses. For differences in abnormal returns t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Table 7 Abnormal returns following all insider sales in 58 firms whose executives enter into hedging transactions against their equity holdings between January 1996 and December 1998. Insider sales are from the period -900 to -120 days relative to the initiation date of the hedging transaction. If the firm does not report any insider trades at least six months prior to the transaction date the firm is dropped from the analysis. For firms with multiple collar transactions, the first collar or swap transaction date is used as the initiation date. Abnormal returns are relative to the equally weighted market index. The full sample consists of 2,460 insider sale transactions. The sample of sales greater than or equal to 10,000 shares consists of 1,153 insider sale transactions. Table 8 Abnormal returns following insider sales by insiders who engage in zero-cost collar and equity swap transactions in 32 firms whose executives enter into hedging transactions against their equity holdings between January 1996 and December 1998. Insider sales are from the period -900 to -120 trading days relative to the initiation date of the hedging transaction. If the firm does not report any insider trades at least six months prior to the transaction date the firm is dropped from the analysis. For firms with multiple collar transactions, the first collar or swap transaction date is used as the initiation date. Abnormal returns are relative to the equally weighted market index. The full sample consists of 248 insider sale transactions. The sample of sales greater than or equal to 10,000 shares consists of 140 insider sale transactions. Table 9 Trading activity by insiders in 60 firms where executives enter into hedging transactions against their equity holdings between January 1996 and December 1998. The benchmark period is measured over the period -900 to -120 trading days relative to the initiation date of the hedging transaction. The event period is measured over the period -120 to -1 trading days relative to the transaction date. If the firm does not exist at least six months prior to the transaction date the firm is dropped from the analysis. If a firm has multiple collar or swap transaction dates, only the first is included. The t-statistic is from a test that the mean of the differences between the event period and the benchmark period is equal to zero. 
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